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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court 
sitting as an appellate court in bankruptcy.  At issue is 
whether, under Pennsylvania law, a non-record interest holder in 
real property is entitled to personal service before a 
foreclosure sale even though notice was mailed to the record 
owners and was posted on the property; and whether a junior 
secured creditor can be a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice, if at the time of sale it knew, or should have known, of 
the unrecorded interest. 
 The bankruptcy court found that Pennsylvania law 
requires personal service to non-record interest holders and that 
the purchaser's knowledge of the non-record interest prevented it 
from being a bona fide purchaser. In re Graves, 142 B.R. 115 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).  The district court affirmed, holding 
that Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure required the 
judgment creditor to give personal notice to all interest holders 
and that the purchaser's knowledge of the non-record interest 
  
prevented it from being a bona fide purchaser. In re Graves, 156 
B.R. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  We hold that, on these facts, 
Pennsylvania law does not require personal service, but that the 
purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser because of its actual 
knowledge of the unrecorded interest.  We will affirm. 
 I. 
 FACTS and PROCEDURE 
 A. Background 
 On October 12, 1983 Thomas Bacon and his grandson, 
Duane Bacon,1 purchased a house at 6133 Nassau Road, Philadelphia 
as tenants in common, each owning a one-half interest.  They paid 
$39,000.00, after obtaining a $24,000.00 mortgage from Liberty 
Savings Bank.  Thomas Bacon lived at 6133 Nassau Road with his 
wife, three of his children, and Duane until he died intestate on 
January 7, 1986.  At the time, no one probated his estate or 
notified Liberty Savings Bank of his death.2  Thomas Bacon's wife 
died in September, 1990.  One son moved away before her death and 
Duane moved away shortly thereafter.  In October, 1990, the house 
was occupied by two of Thomas Bacon's children, his daughter, 
Shirley Graves, and a son, Andrew Bacon. 
                     
1
.  Duane Bacon is the nephew of the appellee, Graves. 
2
.  Thomas Bacon's estate was probated in October 1990.  Probate 
had not been completed as of the time of oral argument before 
this court. 
  
  B.  State Proceedings 
 In November, 1990, Liberty Savings Bank began 
foreclosure proceedings against Thomas and Duane Bacon in 
Philadelphia Common Pleas Court.3  Liberty's attempts to serve 
notice on Thomas and Duane Bacon personally were unsuccessful, so 
on March 4, 1991, after a petition by Liberty, the court 
permitted service by regular mail and by posting notice on the 
property.  A return of service, signed by a deputy sheriff, 
recited that a copy of the complaint was posted on the house on 
March 16, 1991.4  On May 3, 1991, after Thomas and Duane Bacon 
failed to answer Liberty's complaint, the Common Pleas Court 
entered a default judgment, and ordered that notice of the 
judgment be sent to Duane and Thomas Bacon at the house.  Liberty 
then sent Thomas and Duane Bacon notice of a sheriff's sale by 
certified mail.  It also sent notice to all junior creditors, 
including Fleet Consumer Discount Company.5  On September 6, 1991 
notice was posted at the house pursuant to the Common Pleas 
Court's order, as evidenced by a deputy sheriff's return of 
service. 
                     
3
.  The record does not reflect how long the mortgage had gone 
unpaid before Liberty began foreclosure proceedings. 
4
.  Graves admits letters addressed to Thomas and Duane (or Mrs. 
Duane) Bacon were received at the house, but she denies notice 
was ever posted on the house.  
5
.  Apparently unbeknownst to his family Duane Bacon took a 
$12,049.00 second mortgage against his interest in the house from 
Fleet Consumer Discount.  Duane was living in the house when he 
took out the second mortgage. 
  
 At the sheriff's sale on October 7, 1991, Fleet 
purchased the property for $42,000.00.  Fleet attempted to sell 
the house to Graves, but after negotiations failed, Fleet filed 
an eviction action on November 8, 1991.  Graves was served on 
November 16, 1991, but did not file an answer.6  The court 
entered default judgment on January 15, 1992.  
 On April 9, 1992, Graves filed a "Motion to Set Aside 
Sheriff's Sale and/or Set Aside Default," and an "Emergency 
Petition to Stay Eviction" in Common Pleas Court.  The court 
denied the petition to stay the eviction without opinion on April 
14, 1992.  It then denied her motion to set aside the sheriff's 
sale on May 14, 1992, and filed an opinion on August 17, 1992 
holding that the motion was not promptly filed and that Graves 
did not have a meritorious defense to the claim.7 
 C.  Bankruptcy Proceedings 
 On April 22, 1992 Graves filed for bankruptcy.  Fleet 
filed a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay.  At a 
bankruptcy court hearing on June 9, 1992, testimony was given by 
                     
6
.  Although the Affidavit of Service contained a special 
instruction that the server "MUST GET NAME OF INDIVIDUAL 
SERVED!!," the affidavit states only that process was personally 
served on "Adult in charge of Defendant's residence who refused 
to give name or relationship."  Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 
Procedure 402(a)(2)(ii) personal service on an adult in charge of 
defendant's home constitutes valid service on the defendant. 
Flaherty v. Atkins, 152 A.2d 280, 281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959). 
7
.  The Common Pleas Court's judgment was affirmed on appeal by 
the Pennsylvania Superior court. Liberty Savings Bank v. Estate 
of Bacon, No. 02344 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 1993).  A Petition 
for Allowance of Appeal is now pending with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. 
  
Graves and Heather Thompson, the Assistant President of Fleet's 
Upper Darby branch.  There was a subsequent hearing on June 18, 
1992, when the court permitted Fleet to admit certified copies of 
the affidavits of service.8  
 On June 25, 1992, the bankruptcy court denied Fleet's 
motion for relief from the automatic stay.  The court found the 
sheriff's sale invalid on three independent grounds: (1) as the 
holder of an interest in the property Graves was entitled, under 
Pennsylvania law, to personal service, (2) Graves' continuous 
possession of the property put Liberty on constructive notice 
that Graves had an interest in the house which Liberty should 
have investigated before the sale, and (3) Fleet's knowledge of 
Graves' interest in the house prior to the sheriff's sale 
precluded Fleet from being a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice. Graves, 142 B.R. at 117. 
 Fleet appealed to the district court, which affirmed, 
holding that Graves was entitled to personal notice under 
Pennsylvania law.  The district court then upheld the bankruptcy 
court's factual findings that Graves had no prior notice of the 
sheriff's sale, Liberty had knowledge of Graves' interest, and 
Fleet was not a bona fide purchaser.  This timely appeal 
followed.9 
                     
8
.  During the first hearing Fleet had unsuccessfully attempted 
to enter uncertified copies of the affidavits of service. 
9
.  Bankruptcy court jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 
157(b)(1)(1988).  The district court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a), which gives the district courts jurisdiction 
over appeals from final orders of the bankruptcy courts.  The 
district court denied Fleet relief from the automatic stay, a 
  
 In an appeal from a judgment of a bankruptcy court, we 
review factual findings for clear error and apply plenary review 
to questions of law.  "In that sense, our review duplicates that 
of the district court and we view the bankruptcy court decision 
unfettered by the district court's determination." In re Brown, 
951 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 II. 
 DISCUSSION 
 A. Issue Preclusion 
 Under Pennsylvania law, real property cannot be sold at 
sheriff's sale until the interest holders have received notice of 
the sale. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.1 (a) (Supp. 1994).  The 
Bankruptcy court invalidated the sheriff's sale, in part, because 
it believed Liberty failed to give Graves the required notice.  
Before this case reached the bankruptcy court, however, the 
Philadelphia Common Pleas Court had already entered default 
judgments in the ejectment and foreclosure actions, and had 
denied Graves' motion to open the default judgments.  Fleet 
contends that in issuing these rulings the state court found that 
Graves received valid notice.  Thus, throughout the federal 
litigation, Fleet has maintained the state court rulings preclude 
Graves from raising the notice issue under the doctrine of issue 
preclusion.   
(..continued) 
final, appealable order in bankruptcy.  Accordingly, this court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).   
  
 The bankruptcy court rejected Fleet's argument because 
it believed applying issue preclusion under these circumstances 
would violate Graves' right to due process. 142 B.R. at 122.  The 
district court held default judgments do not have preclusive 
effect in subsequent litigation.  We agree issue preclusion does 
not apply here, but we do not reach the due process issue.10 
 Issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of facts 
adjudicated in a prior action. See Edmundson v. Borough of 
Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993); Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1073-74 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state 
court factual findings as would the courts of that state. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 (1988); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985); Grimes v. Vitalink 
Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1562 (3d Cir. 1994), petition 
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3010 (U.S. June 29, 1994)(No. 93-
2098).  Thus, to decide whether issue preclusion applies here we 
must first determine whether Pennsylvania courts would permit 
                     
10
.  The measure of due process is whether "the means employed 
[are] such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." See Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950); see also 
Anderson v. White, 888 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1989)(same).  "When 
the state within which the owner has located such property seizes 
it for some reason, publication or posting affords an additional 
measure of notification." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316.  A procedural 
protection to be adequate, must represent a fair accommodation of 
the respective interests of creditor and debtor. See Jordan v. 
Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1271 (3d Cir. 
1994)(quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 58 (3d Cir. 
1980)(in banc)). 
  
litigation of the notice issue even though default judgments had 
been entered.  We believe they would. 
 In Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod, 
& Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 196 
(1991), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 
 In order to grant a demurrer pursuant to 
[issue preclusion], the objecting party must 
show that "the fact or facts at issue in both 
instances were identical; [and] that these 
facts were essential to the first judgment 
and were actually litigated in the first 
cause."  We have also required that the party 
against whom a plea of [issue preclusion] is 
asserted must have had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in question 
in a prior action. 
587 A.2d at 1348 (citations omitted); see also GPU Indus. 
Intervenors v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 628 A.2d 1187, 
1192-93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (same).  Fleet claims those 
requirements are met here; we cannot agree.  
 1. 
 Fleet contests the bankruptcy court's ability to 
adjudicate the validity of the notice Graves received, in part, 
because Graves raised the notice issue before the Common Pleas 
Court in connection with her motion to open the default 
judgments.  According to Fleet, that court's refusal to open the 
default judgments constituted a judgment on the merits which 
precluded relitigation of the issue before the bankruptcy court.  
We disagree. 
 Even though Graves raised the notice issue in 
connection with her motion to open the default judgments, it was 
  
not "essential" to the judgment. See Muhammad, 587 A.2d at 1348.  
The Common Pleas Court stated, "[a] petition to open a default 
judgment . . . will be granted where the court finds that each of 
three factors are satisfied: 
 (1) the petition has been promptly filed; 
 (2) the default can be reasonably explained or excused; 
and  
 (3) a meritorious defense exists to the underlying 
claim." 
Liberty Sav. Bank v. Estate of Bacon, No. 1387, slip op. at 2 
(C.P. Phila. County Aug. 17, 1992) (citing Fink v. General 
Accident Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 345, 346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).  The 
court then denied Graves' petition because it was not promptly 
filed and because "payment on the mortgage to a third party [does 
not] create a meritorious defense to the claim itself." Id.  
Because the only issue before it was whether to enforce the 
default judgment, the court did not make a finding on the notice 
issue.  Thus, although the notice issue was raised, the court did 
not need to address it, and in fact chose not to.  Consequently, 
we do not believe Pennsylvania's courts would give the judgment 
preclusive effect on the notice issue.  
 Moreover, the bankruptcy court was correct in not 
giving preclusive effect to the orders denying Graves' Motion to 
Open the Default judgments because the order violated the 
automatic stay in bankruptcy.  When a debtor files for bankruptcy 
the Code automatically stays all judicial and administrative 
actions against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).  Graves 
filed for bankruptcy on April 22, 1992.  The Common Pleas Court 
  
issued its orders denying relief from the foreclosure and 
refusing to stay the ejectment on May 14, 1992.  Consequently, 
the orders were void when issued. See Borman v. Raymark Indus., 
Inc., 946 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1991); Association of St. 
Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 
448 (3d Cir. 1982).     
 Fleet maintains the state court orders did not violate 
the stay because the underlying actions were brought by Graves 
instead of against her.  But, in Association of St. Croix 
Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., we expressly 
rejected Fleet's reasoning, stating: 
 Section 362 by its terms only stays proceedings against 
the debtor.  The statute does not address actions 
brought by the debtor which would inure to the benefit 
of the bankruptcy estate . . . .  It might be argued 
that whether an appeal is stayed by section 362 should 
be determined by whether the appeal is taken "by" or 
"against" the debtor, i.e., whether the debtor is the 
appellant or appellee.  We reject this approach. 
 
  In our view, section 362 should be read to stay 
all appeals in proceedings that were originally brought 
against the debtor . . . .  Thus, whether a case is 
subject to the automatic stay must be determined at its 
inception. 
682 F.2d at 448-49.     
 Fleet attempts to distinguish this case from St. Croix 
Hotel Corp. on the grounds that St. Croix Hotel Corp. involved an 
appeal from an action originally brought against the debtor but 
contends this action was originally brought by the debtor.  We 
disagree.   
 Graves never filed a complaint in Common Pleas Court 
and her "action" was never assigned a docket number of its own.  
  
Rather, the dockets indicate Graves filed a motion in Fleet's 
foreclosure and ejectment suits.  In each action the Common Pleas 
Court treated Graves as the defendant, rather than as a new 
plaintiff.  Because the proceedings were originally brought 
against the debtor, the orders denying Graves' motions were 
entered in Liberty's actions against the debtor, and therefore in 
violation of the stay.   
 2. 
 Fleet's issue preclusion argument also fails because 
default judgments are not given preclusive effect in 
Pennsylvania's courts.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
adopted the preclusion principles of the Second Restatement of 
Judgments. See Schubach v. Silver, 336 A.2d 328, 333 (Pa. 1975); 
GPU Indus., 628 A.2d at 1193.  The Restatement provides "[w]hen 
an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a 
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to 
the judgment, the determination is conclusive on a subsequent 
action between the same parties, whether on the same or a 
different claim." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980).  
 Comment e to that section states "[i]n the case of a 
judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the 
issues is actually litigated.  Therefore, the rule of this 
Section does not apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent 
action." Id. cmt. e.  Applying that rule here indicates 
Pennsylvania courts would not give preclusive effect to the 
Common Pleas Court's orders in the foreclosure and ejectment 
actions because Graves did not actually litigate those cases. See 
  
GPU Indus, 628 A.2d at 1193. See generally, 1B James W. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.444[2] (2d ed. 1985).11   
 B. Notice. 
 We turn next to the bankruptcy court's finding that 
Pennsylvania law required Liberty to notify Graves personally of 
the sheriff's sale.  Finding that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 
Procedure 3129 requires an executing creditor to give notice to 
all property owners, the bankruptcy court held the sheriff's sale 
invalid because Graves did not receive prior notice. See 142 B.R. 
at 120.  We disagree.  We do not believe Rule 3129 requires 
personal notice to someone in Graves' position; we also do not 
believe Graves was unaware of the sheriff's sale. 
 1.  Rule 3129 
 In Pennsylvania, notification of a sheriff's sale is 
governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3129.  Rule 3129 
has two main parts which together prescribe how notice must be 
effected.12  Part 1 requires an executing plaintiff to submit an 
                     
11
.  Fleet cites Zimmer v. Zimmer, 326 A.2d 318, 320 (Pa. 1974) 
and Bailey v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 491 A.2d 888, 890 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985) for the proposition that Pennsylvania courts 
consider default judgments to be judgments on the merits for 
purposes of issue preclusion.  However, these case are not 
convincing.  Zimmer was decided in 1974 a year before the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Restatement's principles 
in Schubach.  Bailey did not involve a default judgment, and 
therefore its discussion about the preclusive effect of default 
judgments is dicta.  Moreover, Bailey makes no reference to the 
Restatement or Schubach and as the opinion of an intermediate 
appellate court, is not controlling. 
12
.  A third part only applies when a sheriff's sale is stayed or 
postponed. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.3. 
  
affidavit with the names of parties whose interest could be 
affected by the sale. Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.1 (b).13  Part 2 
requires the plaintiff to send written notice to all persons 
listed in the affidavit, and requires the posting of handbills at 
the Sheriff's office at least 30 days before the sale and the 
publication of notice in local newspapers once a week for at 
least three weeks before the sale. Id. § 3129.2(a). 
    Subsection § 3129.2(c)(1)(i) provides that "[s]ervice 
of notice shall be made upon a defendant in the judgment who has 
not entered an appearance and upon the owner of the property . . 
. ." Id. (numbering omitted) (emphasis supplied).  The bankruptcy 
court interpreted the term "owner of the property" to include 
"every owner of any interest," 142 B.R. at 120, regardless 
whether that interest was recorded or known to the executing 
creditor. Id.  Thus, it concluded the Sheriff's sale was invalid 
because Graves did not receive notice. See 142 B.R. at 120.   
                     
13
.  Rule 3129.1 provides in part: 
 
 (b) The affidavit shall set forth to the best of the 
affiant's knowledge or information and belief as of the date the 
praecipe for the writ of execution was filed the name and address 
or whereabouts of 
 
  (1) the owners or reputed owners of the property; 
  (2) every person who has any record lien on that 
property; 
  (3) every other person who has any record interest 
in that property which may be affected by the sale; and 
  (4) every other person who has any interest in 
that property not of record which may be affected by 
the sale and of which plaintiff has knowledge. 
 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.1(b) (Purdon Supp. 1993). 
  
 We disagree.  Rule 3129.1's plain language 
distinguishes between owners, § (b)(1), other persons having a 
record interest, § (b)(2), and persons having an interest not of 
record, § (b)(4).  If the definition of owner in subsection 
(b)(1) included every owner of any interest, the subsequent 
sections would be surplusage.  We believe, therefore, that an 
owner in this context is any person whose ownership appears of 
record. Cf. Baxter Dunaway, 4 Law of Distressed Real Estate, § 
PA1.05., at PA-10 (Pennsylvania Jurisdictional Summary) (A 
current title search will identify the owner of the property for 
notice purposes under Rule 3129); 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
5860.102 (1990) (defining "Owner" as "the person in whose name 
the property is last registered, if registered according to law" 
for Real Estate Tax Sale Law); Pittsburgh v. Pivirotto, 502 A.2d 
747, 751 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (even though redemption period had 
not expired, record of purchaser's interest in treasury deed book 
triggered notice requirement), aff'd 528 A.2d 125 (Pa. 1987).  
Thus, Graves is not an owner of the property; at most she is an 
interest-holder.   
 Under Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure an 
executing creditor must notify only those persons that fall 
within the categories designated in Rule 3129.1(b) because Rule 
3129.2(c) restricts the persons who must receive written notice 
to those listed on the 3129.1 affidavit.14  Graves was not 
                     
14
.  Rule 3129.2(c) provides that "[t]he written notice . . . 
shall be served . . . on all persons whose names and addresses 
are set forth in the affidavit required by Rule 3129.1."  Pa. R. 
Civ. P. 3129.2 (Purdon Supp. 1993).  Subsection 3129.2(c)(1) 
  
entitled to notice before the sale unless she was either the 
owner or reputed owner of the property, see § 3129.1(b)(1), or a 
non-record interest holder whose interest could be affected by 
the sale and is known by the creditor, see § 3129.1(b)(4).15  
Graves maintains she has a right to personal notice because "of 
her interest in the home being detrimentally affected by the 
Sheriff's Sale."  Appellee Brief at 11.  Thus, we understand 
Graves to argue that she had an interest in the property 
requiring notice under § 3129.2(b)(4), not that she was the owner 
or reputed owner of the property requiring notice under (b)(1). 
 Operating in conjunction with § 3129.2, subsection 
3129.1(b)(4) requires notification of "every other person who has 
any interest in that property not of record which may be affected 
by the sale and of which the plaintiff has knowledge." 
3129.1(b)(4).  The bankruptcy court found that Liberty had 
(..continued) 
declares how certain people are to receive written notice, not 
who is to be notified. See Rule 3129.2 Explanatory Comment -- 
1989 ("subdivision (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) dictate different 
methods of service . . . .").  Interpreting Rule 3129.2(c)(1) as 
compelling written notice to every owner, regardless whether that 
owner falls within the definitions in Rule 3129.1(b), makes the 
section internally inconsistent because the subsection would 
require notice to all owners, while the main section would 
require notice only to those persons covered by the Rule 3129.1 
affidavit.  When interpreting a statute "a construction which 
would create confusion should be avoided." 2A Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.12, at 61 (5th ed. 1992); 
cf. id. § 46.06 (effect must be given to every clause and 
sentence). 
15
.  Because Graves did not have a record interest, notice was 
not required by (b)(2), which requires notice to all record 
lienholders, or (b)(3), which requires notice to any record 
interest holders whose interest could be affected by the sale. 
  
constructive notice of Graves' interest because of her clear and 
open possession of the property. 142 B.R. at 121.  The district 
court held this finding was not clearly erroneous. 156 B.R. at 
955.  We cannot agree.   
 In Pennsylvania, clear and open possession of real 
property constitutes constructive notice to subsequent purchasers 
of the rights of the party in possession. See McCannon v. 
Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1982); Overly v. Hixson, 82 
A.2d 573, 575 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951).  Graves lived at the house, 
without interruption, since before Thomas Bacon's death.  
Consequently, the bankruptcy court held Graves was entitled to 
personal service because Liberty had constructive knowledge of 
Graves' interest. 142 B.R. at 120-21. 
 The bankruptcy court correctly stated Pennsylvania's 
general rule for constructive notice; however, an exception to 
the rule provides that where a possessor lives with a record 
owner in a manner consistent with the record ownership, no 
constructive knowledge is imputed. Overly, 82 A.2d at 575.  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court explained the rule, stating: 
 There can be no doubt whatever of the 
proposition that where the land is occupied 
by two persons . . .  and there is a recorded 
title in one of them, such joint occupation 
is not notice of an unrecorded title in the 
other. *** The rule is universal that, if the 
possession be consistent with the recorded 
title, it is no notice of an unrecorded 
title. 
 
 Indeed, this conclusion is but an application 
of the general principle that, in the absence 
of proof to the contrary, actual possession 
is presumed to be in him who has the record 
  
title.  It would be intolerable to require an 
intending purchaser or incumbrancer to ask 
every person living in a property, be they 
many or few, whether or not he has a better 
title than the record owner, who is also in 
possession. 
Overly, 82 A.2d at 575 (citations omitted).   
 According to Graves' undisputed testimony, Duane Bacon 
lived on the property until September, 1990.  Liberty commenced 
the foreclosure action in November, 1990 approximately two months 
after Duane Bacon left.  Although Graves was in clear and open 
possession when the foreclosure action began, it was inconsistent 
with the record ownership for less than two months.  Furthermore, 
Graves has not pointed to any evidence which would have put 
Liberty on notice of her interest.  Neither side cites any 
authority for the length of time possession has to be 
inconsistent with the record before an execution creditor is put 
on constructive notice; however, absent any other evidence 
indicating Liberty should have known of the record owner's 
departure or Graves' open possession, we believe Liberty was not 
on notice that a new ownership interest had been created.  
Accordingly, there was no evidence to trigger Rule 3129.1(b)(4)'s 
notification requirement.   
 2.  Notice sent to Graves 
 At the June 9 bankruptcy hearing Graves testified she 
was unaware of the sheriff's sale until October 8, the day after 
the sale took place.  At the same hearing Fleet's Assistant 
Branch President, Thompson, testified that Fleet had sent several 
letters to Thomas and Duane Bacon at the house notifying them of 
  
the sale, and that a Fleet employee had attempted to contact 
Graves by telephone prior to the sheriff's sale.  The bankruptcy 
court found Graves was not notified of the sale, stating, 
"[h]aving observed the Debtor, we find her credibility outweighs 
the hearsay statements contained in Fleet's records to the 
contrary." 142 B.R. at 121.   
 Were this the full extent of the evidence presented to 
the bankruptcy court we might agree with its finding because our 
review of factual findings is limited to clear error, In re 
Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir. 1991), and we give deference to 
the trial court's determination of credibility.  But the record 
also contained a return of service signed by a Philadelphia 
deputy sheriff which stated that notice of the sheriff's sale was 
posted at 6133 Nassau St. on September 6, 1991, one month before 
the sale took place.16  In the face of objective evidence that 
notice was conspicuously posted at the house we believe the 
bankruptcy court erred in finding Graves never received notice.  
Our conviction is buttressed by Graves claim that she was also 
                     
16
.   In Pennsylvania a sheriff's return of service is conclusive 
with respect to facts of which the sheriff has personal 
knowledge. See Hollinger v. Hollinger, 206 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1965); 
Pennsylvania ex rel. McKinney v. McKinney, 381 A.2d 453 (Pa. 
1977); Collins v. Park, 621 A.2d 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); 
Miller v. Carr, 292 A.2d 423, 424 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972).  "The 
rule . . . is based upon the presumption that a sheriff, acting 
in the course of his official duties, acts with propriety and, 
therefore, when the sheriff in the course of his official duties 
makes a statement, by way of an official return, such statement 
is given conclusive effect."  Hollinger, 206 A.2d at 2.  Although 
federal courts need not apply the same rule, we recognize the 
policy behind the rule and accordingly give weight to an 
objective indication that process has been served. 
  
unaware of the foreclosure action, despite a deputy sheriff's 
return of service stating that a copy of the complaint was posted 
at the house on March 16, 1991.  No evidence was presented that 
either return of service was in any way irregular.  We are faced, 
therefore, with two returns of service to the residence of the 
same defendant that have the appearance of regularity.  Under 
these circumstances, the record as a whole leaves us with the 
firm conviction that the court erred in finding Graves did not 
receive notice.17 
 C. Bona Fide Purchaser 
 Fleet contends its purchase of the property is valid, 
even if the sale was conducted without regard to Graves' 
interest, because it was a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice.  The bankruptcy court held that Fleet was not a bona fide 
purchaser because Fleet was aware of Graves' interest when it 
purchased the house at the sheriff's sale. 142 B.R. at 121.  In 
Pennsylvania, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
takes clear of any interest that was violated by the sale.  See 
Phillips v. Stroup, 17 A. 220 (Pa. 1889); Schuchman v. Borough of 
Homestead, 2 A. 407 (Pa. 1886).  Based largely on Thompson's 
testimony, the bankruptcy court found Fleet had knowledge of 
                     
17
.  Fleet contends any lack of notice on Graves' part was her 
own fault because she failed to read notices Liberty sent to 
Thomas and Duane Bacon at the house.  Thus, Fleet asks us to hold 
that Graves is estopped from claiming lack of notice as a 
defense.  Because we find Graves received notice of the 
foreclosure action and the sheriff's sale we do not reach this 
issue. 
  
Graves' interest in the property,18 and Fleet's knowledge 
prevented it from being a bona fide purchaser. 142 B.R. at 121. 
 The district court affirmed on somewhat different 
grounds finding that Fleet was put on constructive notice of 
Graves' interest when a Fleet employee contacted Graves by 
telephone on June 25, 1991. 156 B.R. at 957.  Thus, the district 
court concluded Fleet was required "to investigate whether the 
possessor claimed to have any legal or equitable interest in the 
property." Id.  On appeal, Fleet argues the district court should 
have either accepted its contention that there was a conversation 
between Fleet and Graves (and conclude Graves had notice of the 
sale), or accept Graves' argument that no such conversation took 
place (and conclude Fleet did not have knowledge of Graves' 
possession and interest).  We disagree.   
 We have already held that Graves had notice of the 
sale, but Graves notice does not affect Fleet's status as a bona 
fide purchaser.  Under Pennsylvania law actual or constructive 
knowledge of an unrecorded deed defeats a subsequent claimant's 
interest. See Long John Silver's, Inc. v. Fiore, 386 A.2d 569, 
573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) ("to qualify as a bona fide purchaser, 
the subsequent buyer must be without notice of the prior 
equitable estate)(citation omitted); Overly v. Hixson, 82 A.2d 
573, 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951); see also United States v. 
                     
18
.  During her testimony Thompson "described records of contacts 
of Fleet with the Debtor and Duane in June, 1991 which made Fleet 
aware that Thomas was deceased and that Debtor claimed to be one 
of his heirs." 142 B.R. at 118. 
  
Purcell, 798 F. Supp. 1102, 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd 972 F.2d 
1334 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 Fleet was aware that someone other than Duane Bacon had 
an interest in the property as early as 1988 when he applied 
individually for a mortgage on his half interest in the house.  
Thompson testified before the bankruptcy court that "[Fleet] knew 
at the time of the loan that [Thomas Bacon] was deceased."  
Therefore, the bankruptcy court's finding that Fleet had 
knowledge of Graves' interest was not clearly erroneous.  
Further, because Fleet knew Thomas was deceased and that the 
property was jointly held,  we believe that when Fleet purchased 
the property it had knowledge that someone owned the other 
interest.19  
 Yet Fleet claims it is a bona fide purchaser, despite 
its knowledge of Graves' interest, because knowledge of a 
contrary interest only requires a prospective purchaser to 
investigate the purported ownership interest, which they did.  We 
disagree.  When a purchaser buys real property with knowledge of 
                     
19
.  Thompson testified she did not know the extent to which any 
investigation was done to determine who inherited Thomas Bacon's 
interest.  In response to the bankruptcy court's inquiry about 
what steps were taken to find the holder of Thomas' interest, 
Thompson replied: 
 Well, honestly, your Honor, I really don't 
know.  I'm assuming that they go their 
standard questions [sic] that we ask about 
other names that appear on the title search.  
If they're deceased, we say are there any 
relatives, and if the party says no, then we 
proceed.  And if the party says, yes, then we 
ask them to co-sign.  We'll find out to the 
extent [i]f that's true or not. 
  
an unrecorded interest, the purchaser's interest is subject to 
that of the unrecorded interest holder. See, e.g., Long John 
Silver's, 386 A.2d at 572-73; Purcell, 798 F. Supp. at 1116-17.  
For example, in Long John Silver's, when two purchasers had 
actual notice of an unrecorded equity interest in a piece of 
property, the court held the equity interest was superior to that 
of the subsequent purchasers. 386 A.2d at 572-73.  The Superior 
Court explained, "[i]f the subsequent purchaser has notice of the 
first agreement of sale or deed, he has no protection as a bona 
fide purchaser and his title is subject to the interest vested in 
the first purchaser." Id. at 573.   
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated "a 
fundamental rule in construing recording laws generally [is] that 
actual notice of an unrecorded instrument, if received by a 
subsequent lienor before his interest attaches, is equivalent to 
the constructive notice which recording provides." Purcell, 798 
F. Supp. at 1117 (quoting In re 250 Bell Road, 388 A.2d 297, 299-
300 n.1 (Pa. 1978)).  Because a purchaser's knowledge of the 
unrecorded interest subordinates the purchaser's interest to that 
of the unrecorded interest holder, Fleet's knowledge of an 
outstanding unrecorded ownership interest prevents it from being 
a bona fide purchaser.  Consequently, we believe the sale was 
voidable.20 
                     
20
.  Fleet argued the bankruptcy court erred by sua sponte 
raising the issue whether Fleet was a bona fide purchaser.  Fleet 
claims a bankruptcy court can only raise certain issues sua 
sponte.  We find no merit in this position.  Determining whether 
or not to allow a claim against the property of the estate is a 
  
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the bankruptcy court denying relief from the automatic stay. 
(..continued) 
core proceeding expressly assigned to the bankruptcy court. See 
11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). 
